

The IPF Research Session

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The Treatment of Covenant Strength by the Property Industry

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Structure

- The importance of covenant strength
 - Income as the key driver of return
- Macroeconomic context
 - Liquidations and default
- The pricing of covenant strength risk
 - Lender's perspective
 - Investor's perspective
- Property pricing
 - Market evidence ~IPD data
 - Valuer's perspective *work in progress*
 - Reporting of covenant strength risk- work in progress



Research Methodology

- Part quantitative, part qualitative
- Insolvency & delinquency data from D&B
- Yield data from IPD
- Interviews with lenders (8) & investors (9)
 - May to August 2008
- Questionnaire survey of valuers
 - October 2008
- Research carried out during period of considerable financial turmoil



The UK Property Market -2007/08/09 - the "triple dip"

1st The fall in capital values

The Market Dips

2nd The "credit crunch" effect

3rd The economy and occupier market



The Importance of Covenant Strength





The Importance of Covenant Strength

- Income as the key driver of return





Average probability of insolvency

Source: D&B





Average probability of delinguency





Lender's Perspective

- balance sheet & securitised loans
- Sharp differences in behaviour & pricing
- Pre August 2007: strong growth in lending
 - by end 2007, 11% of total lending to property
 - covenant strength insufficiently weighted
- Post August 2007 ~ severe illiquidity
- Repricing
 - LTV decreasing
 - Interest cover ratio increasing
 - Margins increasing, over LIBOR, not base rate



Loan to Value Ratio

(Source: De Montfort University)





Lender's Assessment of Loans





Pricing of Loans

No consensus on weighting, but key factors

Balance Sheet

- Property fundamentals
- Strength of the borrower
- Strength of tenant
- Cash flow of the scheme
- Lease length & reletting
- Level of return
- Existing customer

Securitised

- Expected *rating* of securitised vehicle
- Strength of the tenant
- Cash flow of the scheme
- Sector prospects
- Property fundamentals
- "Velocity of capital"



Example of pricing of senior debt

- 10/15year lease, good covenant

	Prior to mid 2007	2008
LTV ratio	>80%	<75%
Margin (in bps)	<100	>140-170
Interest cover	1.15	1.35 -1.45
Fees (in bps)	35	100



Repricing of securitised loans European 5-Year AAA CMBS spread

Source: MarkIT





Repricing of securitised loans European 5-Year BBB CMBS spreads

Source: MarkIT





Investor's Perspective





Risk Premium

3 key components highlighted:

\rightarrow Lease length

 \rightarrow Sector

\rightarrow Covenant Strength

Weighting depends on **stage of cycle**



Average lease length

- weighted by rent passing (Source BPF)



	Ave. lease length
1999	14.3
2000	14.0
2001	12.9
2002	12.3
2003	11.7
2004	12.4
2005	11.0

2006	9.8



Systematic and Specific Risk

- Sector risk a "semi systematic" risk
- Due to high lot size not always possible to fully diversify portfolio
- Return performance across sectors differ certain sectors are more volatile than others
- Some viewed as defensive, others aggressive
- Need to consider β



Sector	Beta
Shopping centres	0.73
Retail warehouses	0.82
Office: City	1.17
Office: West End & Midtown	1.43
Industrial Rest of UK	0.82



- Rising market: lower risk premium, but stage of cycle?
- Falling market: higher risk premium
 - Combination of lease length, cov. strength and sector, vital
- All investors tracked arrears to some degree, but no information on sector/ regional analysis
- Defaults expected to rise, but uncertain the impact an increase in default would have on overall portfolio returns
- Reporting of cov strength by valuers inconsistent



- Initial survey showed no identifiable relationship between the equivalent yield and the credit risk score
- Reworked including unexpired lease length
- Cov. strength based on IPD IRIS bandings:

- 0-15:high risk, 85-100 low/negligible risk

• Unexpired lease length (assumes break option exercised):

0-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 20 + years

• Weighted results



An example, Offices South East

(Illustrates number of observations, mean equivalent yields are highlighted and standard deviations)

2007

		High	Med-High	Low-Med	Low	Neg
0-5 years	No	5	42	156	94	170
	Mean	7.79	7.26	7.40	7.43	7.33
	Std Dev	1.26663	0.86287	0.93050	0.89504	0.89568
6-10 years	No	13	50	104	80	163
	Mean	6.88	6.91	6.84	6.78	6.62
	Std Dev	0.79118	0.69054	0.81855	0.65824	0.74399
11-15 years	No	1	10	22	14	70
	Mean	5.39	6.52	6.27	5.95	6.22
	Std Dev		1.02001	0.63700	0.61529	0.68927
16-20 years	No		1	2		14
-	Mean		6.50	5.96		5.84
	Std Dev			0.60494		0.48473
20+ years	No			1	3	16
	Mean			4.78	5.44	5.50
	Std Dev				0.27469	1.17019

		High	Med-High	Low-Med	Low	Neg
0-5 years	Equiv Yield	7.79	7.26	7.40	7.43	7.33
6-10 years	Equiv Yield	6.88	6.91	6.84	6.78	6.62
11-15 years	Equiv Yield	5.39	6.52	6.27	5.95	6.22
16-20 years	Equiv Yield		6.50	5.96		5.84
20+ years	Equiv Yield			4.78	5.44	5.50



Offices South East – Yield Shift bps movement from Dec 2006 to Dec 2007

Risk/ Yrs	High	Med-High	Low-Med	Low	Neg
0-5	118	63	62	68	69
6-10	94	81	75	90	70
11-15	15	88	58	45	78
16-20		143	59		68
20 +			-38	3	66



Conclusion

- Risk of default is increasing income return under pressure
- "Cheap money" and over zealous lending fuelled price spike
- Investors strong pursuit of a "position" in market led to yield compression
- Covenant strength insufficiently weighted by lenders and investors
- Consistent calibration of the impact of covenant strength not possible, due to range of permutations
- Risk needs to be fully evaluated in conjunction with lease length, sector and stage of economic and property cycle

